Sentry Vulnerability Corpus

This page renders the structured benchmark corpus from packages/docs/src/data/benchmarking/*.json. Add another corpus by dropping a new JSON file in that directory.

Only validated security vulnerabilities whose vulnerable code lives in the public getsentry/sentry repository belong here. Private repository findings, candidate findings, and unrelated product bugs are out of scope.

Each finding carries a Sentry repository SHA and links to the referenced file at that revision. The current SHA values are inferred from capture timestamps. As we backfill from the original tickets, fix commits, or raw run logs, replace them with the most recent SHA known to still contain the vulnerability.

86 findings

sentry-vuln-001

POST /accept-invite lets authenticated users delete arbitrary org members without validating the invite token.

getsentry/sentry@788ba30f1aa4View source

        data={"details": "unable to accept organization invite"},
    )
elif helper.member_already_exists:
    response = Response(
        status=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST, data={"details": "member already exists"}
    )
elif not helper.valid_request:
    return Response(
        status=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST,
        data={"details": "unable to accept organization invite"},
    )

sentry-vuln-002

DSN lookup leaks project metadata to org members without access to the project.

getsentry/sentry@2d929588e20bView source

}
owner = ApiOwner.ISSUES
permission_classes = (OrganizationDetectorPermission,)

sentry-vuln-003

InternalEAFeaturesEndpoint is reachable by authenticated users instead of requiring org:admin.

getsentry/sentry@2d929588e20bView source

@cell_silo_endpoint
class InternalEAFeaturesEndpoint(Endpoint):

sentry-vuln-004

OAuth /userinfo returns PII for tokens tied to inactive users or disabled OAuth apps.

getsentry/sentry@2d929588e20bView source

@control_silo_endpoint
class OAuthUserInfoEndpoint(Endpoint):
    publish_status = {
        "GET": ApiPublishStatus.PRIVATE,
    }
    owner = ApiOwner.ENTERPRISE
    authentication_classes = ()
    permission_classes = ()

sentry-vuln-005

OAuth /userinfo looks up plaintext token values, bypassing the hashed-token path.

getsentry/sentry@2d929588e20bView source

access_token = auth_header[1].decode("utf-8")
try:
    token_details = ApiToken.objects.get(token=access_token)
except ApiToken.DoesNotExist:
    raise BearerTokenInvalid()

sentry-vuln-006

Plugin deprecation info enumerates project rules and groups without per-project access checks.

getsentry/sentry@2d929588e20bView source

owner = ApiOwner.ECOSYSTEM

def get(self, request, organization, plugin_slug):
    """
    Returns a list of objects that are affected by a plugin deprecation. Objects could be issues or alert rules or both
    pparam: organization, plugin_slug
    """
    # Plugins in the db are stored in lowercase but there is not guarantee that's how the customer will call the API
    plugin = plugin_slug.lower()
    plugin_projects = Project.objects.filter(
        status=ObjectStatus.ACTIVE,

sentry-vuln-007

Release threshold index returns every org's rows when projects_list resolves empty.

getsentry/sentry@2d929588e20bView source

}

def get(self, request: Request, organization: Organization) -> HttpResponse:
    validator = ReleaseThresholdIndexGETValidator(
        data=request.query_params,
    )
    if not validator.is_valid():
        return Response(validator.errors, status=400)

    environments_list = self.get_environments(request, organization)
    projects_list = self.get_projects(request, organization)

sentry-vuln-008

SYSTEM_OPTIONS_ALLOWLIST behaves as a substring match because of a missing comma.

getsentry/sentry@2d929588e20bView source

SYSTEM_OPTIONS_ALLOWLIST = (
    # Used during setup before the superadmin role with the options.admin permission is authed
    "system.admin-email"
)


@all_silo_endpoint
class SystemOptionsEndpoint(Endpoint):
    publish_status = {
        "GET": ApiPublishStatus.PRIVATE,
        "PUT": ApiPublishStatus.PRIVATE,
    }

sentry-vuln-009

Unescaped transaction name in root-cause analysis enables Sentry search filter injection.

getsentry/sentry@fbecd17d210cView source

snuba_params=snuba_params,
selected_columns=selected_columns,
equations=[],
query=f'event.type:transaction transaction:"{transaction}"',
limit=limit,

sentry-vuln-010

PUT /system/options/ logs cleartext option values, including credentials.

getsentry/sentry@fbecd17d210cView source

else:
    options.set(k, v, channel=options.UpdateChannel.APPLICATION)

logger.info(
    "options.update",
    extra={
        "ip_address": request.META["REMOTE_ADDR"],
        "user_id": request.user.id,
        "option_key": k,
        "option_value": v,
    },

sentry-vuln-011

Jira install webhook does not bind verified JWT iss to body clientKey; partial fix left residual replay risk.

getsentry/sentry@9fc06de579fbView source

def post(self, request: Request, *args, **kwargs) -> Response:
    with IntegrationPipelineViewEvent(
        interaction_type=IntegrationPipelineViewType.VERIFY_INSTALLATION,
        domain=IntegrationDomain.PROJECT_MANAGEMENT,
        provider_key=self.provider,
    ).capture() as lifecycle:
        token = self.get_token(request)
        state = request.data
        if not state:
            lifecycle.record_failure(ProjectManagementFailuresReason.INSTALLATION_STATE_MISSING)

sentry-vuln-012

MS Teams action submission does not scope the target group to the integration organization.

getsentry/sentry@9fc06de579fbView source

        return response

def _handle_action_submitted(self, request: Request) -> Response:
    # pull out parameters
    data = request.data
    channel_data = data["channelData"]
    tenant_id = channel_data["tenant"]["id"]
    payload = data["value"]["payload"]
    group_id = payload["groupId"]
    integration_id = payload["integrationId"]
    user_id = data["from"]["id"]

sentry-vuln-013

PerforceIntegration.get_config_data exposes the Perforce password to any org member with org:read.

getsentry/sentry@9fc06de579fbView source

def get_config_data(self) -> Mapping[str, Any]:
    """
    Get current configuration values for the integration.

    This is called by the serializer to populate the form fields with existing values.
    Since we store credentials in integration.metadata (not org_integration.config),
    we override the base implementation to read from metadata.

    Returns:
        Dictionary of current configuration values that will be used to populate
        the form fields defined in get_organization_config()
    """

sentry-vuln-014

SlackOptionsLoadEndpoint discloses any project's teams and members across tenants.

getsentry/sentry@9fc06de579fbView source

@cell_silo_endpoint
class SlackOptionsLoadEndpoint(Endpoint):
    owner = ApiOwner.ECOSYSTEM
    publish_status = {
        "POST": ApiPublishStatus.PRIVATE,
    }
    authentication_classes = ()
    permission_classes = ()
    slack_request_class = SlackOptionsLoadRequest

sentry-vuln-015

Replays data_export_notifications lets any authenticated user trigger arbitrary GCS transfer jobs.

getsentry/sentry@9fc06de579fbView source

@control_silo_endpoint
class DataExportNotificationsEndpoint(Endpoint):
    """PubSub notifications endpoint."""

    owner = ApiOwner.DATA_BROWSING
    publish_status = {"POST": ApiPublishStatus.PRIVATE}
    permission_classes = (SentryIsAuthenticated,)

    def post(self, request: Request) -> Response:
        retry_transfer_job_run(request.data, request_run_transfer_job)
        return Response("", status=200)

sentry-vuln-016

Replay DELETE accepts project:read, letting read-only members delete replays.

getsentry/sentry@9fc06de579fbView source

class ReplayDetailsPermission(ProjectPermission):
    scope_map = {
        "GET": ["project:read", "project:write", "project:admin"],
        "POST": ["project:write", "project:admin"],
        "PUT": ["project:write", "project:admin"],
        "DELETE": ["project:read", "project:write", "project:admin"],
    }

sentry-vuln-017

Preprod snapshot GET/DELETE skips has_project_access, enabling cross-team read and destroy.

getsentry/sentry@9fc06de579fbView source

def delete(self, request: Request, organization: Organization, snapshot_id: str) -> Response:
    if not settings.IS_DEV and not features.has(
        "organizations:preprod-snapshots", organization, actor=request.user
    ):
        return Response({"detail": "Feature not enabled"}, status=403)

    try:
        artifact = PreprodArtifact.objects.select_related("project").get(
            id=snapshot_id, project__organization_id=organization.id
        )
    except (PreprodArtifact.DoesNotExist, ValueError):
        return Response({"detail": "Snapshot not found"}, status=404)

sentry-vuln-018

Pinned-search PUT overwrites another user's GroupSearchView when caller starred it at position 0.

getsentry/sentry@9fc06de579fbView source

)

# This entire endpoint will be removed once custom views are GA'd
first_starred_view = GroupSearchViewStarred.objects.filter(
    organization=organization, user_id=request.user.id, position=0
).first()

if first_starred_view:
    default_view = first_starred_view.group_search_view
    default_view.query = result["query"]
    default_view.query_sort = result["sort"]

sentry-vuln-019

ControlAccessService.can_override_sso_as_owner excludes by the wrong primary key, creating a narrow SSO bypass risk.

getsentry/sentry@9fc06de579fbView source

"""If an owner is trying to gain access, allow bypassing SSO if there are no
other owners with SSO enabled.
"""
# get member role
try:
    member_role = OrganizationMemberMapping.objects.get(
        organizationmember_id=member.id, organization_id=member.organization_id
    ).role
except OrganizationMemberMapping.DoesNotExist:
    return False

sentry-vuln-020

Account-merge endpoint never enforces verification-code expiry or single-use.

getsentry/sentry@9fc06de579fbView source

token = models.CharField(max_length=64, default=generate_token)
expires_at = models.DateTimeField(default=generate_expires_at)

class Meta:
    app_label = "sentry"
    db_table = "sentry_user_verification_codes_temp"

__repr__ = sane_repr("user_id", "token")

def regenerate_token(self) -> None:
    self.token = generate_token()
    self.refresh_expires_at()
    self.save()

sentry-vuln-021

Codecov repository token regeneration accepts org:read for destructive token rotation.

getsentry/sentry@9fc06de579fbView source

class RepositoryTokenRegeneratePermission(OrganizationPermission):
    scope_map = {
        "GET": ["org:read", "org:write", "org:admin"],
        "POST": ["org:read", "org:write", "org:admin"],
    }

sentry-vuln-022

ExploreSavedQueryVisitEndpoint.post skips check_object_permissions.

getsentry/sentry@9fc06de579fbView source

@cell_silo_endpoint
class ExploreSavedQueryVisitEndpoint(ExploreSavedQueryBase):
    publish_status = {
        "POST": ApiPublishStatus.PRIVATE,
    }

    def has_feature(self, organization, request):
        return features.has(
            "organizations:visibility-explore-view", organization, actor=request.user
        )

    def post(self, request: Request, organization, query) -> Response:
        """

sentry-vuln-023

Flag webhook signing-secret POST allows org:read members to plant first-time secrets.

getsentry/sentry@9fc06de579fbView source

    )

def post(self, request: Request, organization: Organization) -> Response:
    validator = FlagWebhookSigningSecretValidator(data=request.data)
    if not validator.is_valid():
        return self.respond(validator.errors, status=400)

    # these scopes can always update or post secrets
    has_permission = request.access.has_scope("org:write") or request.access.has_scope(
        "org:admin"
    )

sentry-vuln-024

Sentry App alert-rule trigger dispatch does not verify the installation belongs to the caller's org.

getsentry/sentry@9fc06de579fbView source

    return Response(uuid_context, status=202)

try:
    created_alert_rule_ui_component = trigger_sentry_app_action_creators_for_issues(
        kwargs["actions"]
    )
except SentryAppBaseError as e:

sentry-vuln-025

ExternalTeamDetailsEndpoint scopes only by org, allowing cross-team modify, delete, and reparent.

getsentry/sentry@9fc06de579fbView source

owner = ApiOwner.ENTERPRISE

def convert_args(
    self,
    request: Request,
    organization_id_or_slug: int | str,
    team_id_or_slug: int | str,
    external_team_id: int,
    *args: Any,
    **kwargs: Any,
) -> tuple[Any, Any]:

sentry-vuln-026

UnlinkIdentityView deletes identities by external_id without proving caller ownership.

getsentry/sentry@9fc06de579fbView source

class UnlinkIdentityView(IdentityLinkageView, ABC):
    @property
    def confirmation_template(self) -> str:
        return "sentry/auth-unlink-identity.html"

    @property
    def no_identity_template(self) -> str | None:
        """Optional page to show if identities were not found."""
        return None

sentry-vuln-027

Slack action handler get_rule fetches Rule by ID without org scoping; exploitability is narrowed to rule-ID enumeration.

getsentry/sentry@9fc06de579fbView source

def get_rule(
    slack_request: SlackActionRequest, organization: Organization, group_type: int
) -> Rule | None:
    from sentry.notifications.notification_action.utils import should_fire_workflow_actions

    """Get the rule that fired"""
    rule_id = slack_request.callback_data.get("rule")
    if not rule_id:
        return None

sentry-vuln-028

get_shared_for_org can bypass the target org's disable_shared_issues flag through slug confusion.

getsentry/sentry@9fc06de579fbView source

        data={"details": "unable to accept organization invite"},
    )
elif helper.member_already_exists:
    response = Response(
        status=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST, data={"details": "member already exists"}
    )
elif not helper.valid_request:
    return Response(
        status=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST,
        data={"details": "unable to accept organization invite"},
    )

sentry-vuln-029

Metric-alert team-target lookup is unscoped while user-target lookup is scoped.

getsentry/sentry@9fc06de579fbView source

        result[action.id] = None

if user_actions:
    dcgas = DataConditionGroupAction.objects.filter(
        action__in=[a.id for a in user_actions]
    ).select_related("condition_group")
    org_by_action_id = {
        dcga.action_id: dcga.condition_group.organization_id for dcga in dcgas
    }

    org_members = OrganizationMember.objects.filter(

sentry-vuln-030

OrganizationPreprodArtifactApprove is missing has_project_access.

getsentry/sentry@9fc06de579fbView source

@cell_silo_endpoint
class OrganizationPreprodArtifactApproveEndpoint(OrganizationEndpoint):
    owner = ApiOwner.EMERGE_TOOLS
    publish_status = {
        "POST": ApiPublishStatus.EXPERIMENTAL,
    }
    permission_classes = (OrganizationReleasePermission,)

    def post(self, request: Request, organization: Organization, artifact_id: str) -> Response:
        feature_type_str = request.data.get("feature_type")
        if feature_type_str not in FEATURE_TYPE_MAP:
            return Response(
                {"detail": f"feature_type must be one of: {', '.join(FEATURE_TYPE_MAP.keys())}"},

sentry-vuln-031

Public preprod size analysis misses has_project_access on head and base artifacts.

getsentry/sentry@9fc06de579fbView source

"""
Retrieve size analysis results for a given artifact.

Returns size metrics including download size, install size, and optional insights.
When a base artifact exists (either from commit comparison or via the `baseArtifactId` parameter),
comparison data showing size differences is included.

The response `state` field indicates the analysis status:
- `PENDING`: Analysis has not started yet.
- `PROCESSING`: Analysis is currently running.
- `FAILED` / `NOT_RAN`: Analysis did not complete; `errorCode` and `errorMessage` are included.
- `COMPLETED`: Analysis finished successfully with full size data.
"""

sentry-vuln-032

ProjectKey RPC service drops organization_id; a reachable AWS Lambda integration config path can leak cross-org DSN material.

getsentry/sentry@7f41cc502faaView source

    return None

def get_project_key(
    self, organization_id: int, project_id: int, role: ProjectKeyRole
) -> RpcProjectKey | None:
    return self._get_project_key(project_id=project_id, role=role)

def get_default_project_key(
    self, *, organization_id: int, project_id: int
) -> RpcProjectKey | None:
    try:
        project = Project.objects.get_from_cache(id=project_id)

sentry-vuln-033

replay_counts issue.id branch overwrites snuba_params.projects, bypassing project access scoping.

getsentry/sentry@9fc06de579fbView source

if select_column == "replay_id":
    # just return a mapping of replay_id:replay_id instead of hitting the dataset.
    identity_map = {}
    for replay_id in column_value:
        # raises ValueError if invalid. Strips '-'
        replay_id = uuid.UUID(hex=replay_id, version=4).hex
        identity_map[replay_id] = [replay_id]
    return identity_map

# The client may or may not have narrowed the request by project-id. We have a

sentry-vuln-034

Seer autofix run_id is not bound to group in handoff and continue paths.

getsentry/sentry@9fc06de579fbView source

"""
if not group.organization.get_option(
    "sentry:enable_seer_coding", default=ENABLE_SEER_CODING_DEFAULT
):
    raise PermissionDenied("Code generation is disabled for this organization")

auto_create_pr = False
repo_definitions: list[SeerRepoDefinition] = []
if features.has("organizations:seer-project-settings-read-from-sentry", group.organization):
    preference = read_preference_from_sentry_db(group.project)
    repo_definitions = preference.repositories

sentry-vuln-035

Autofix automation settings GET bypasses get_projects, returning settings for inaccessible projects.

getsentry/sentry@9fc06de579fbView source

def get(self, request: Request, organization: Organization) -> Response:
    """
    List projects with their autofix automation settings.

    :pparam string organization_id_or_slug: the id or slug of the organization.
    :qparam string query: Optional search query to filter by project name or slug.
    :auth: required
    """
    serializer = SeerAutofixSettingGetResponseSerializer(
        data={
            "query": request.GET.get("query"),
        }

sentry-vuln-036

Supergroups validates org but skips has_project_access on supplied group IDs.

getsentry/sentry@9fc06de579fbView source

permission_classes = (OrganizationSupergroupsByGroupPermission,)

def get(self, request: Request, organization: Organization) -> Response:
    if not features.has("organizations:top-issues-ui", organization, actor=request.user):
        return Response({"detail": "Feature not available"}, status=403)

    raw_group_ids = request.GET.getlist("group_id")
    try:
        group_ids = [int(gid) for gid in raw_group_ids]
    except ValueError:
        return Response(

sentry-vuln-037

Sentry App cell service makes user optional, dropping has_project_access for live callers.

getsentry/sentry@9fc06de579fbView source

class DatabaseBackedSentryAppCellService(SentryAppCellService):
    def get_select_options(
        self,
        *,
        organization_id: int,
        installation: RpcSentryAppInstallation,
        uri: str,
        user: RpcUser | None = None,
        project_id: int | None = None,
        query: str | None = None,

sentry-vuln-038

GroupEventJsonView checks org scope but not project access before returning event JSON.

getsentry/sentry@9fc06de579fbView source

@control_silo_endpoint
class SentryAppInstallationExternalIssueActionsEndpoint(SentryAppInstallationBaseEndpoint):

sentry-vuln-039

Open periods endpoint resolves detector/group with org-only scope and no has_project_access.

getsentry/sentry@9fc06de579fbView source

permission_classes = (OrganizationDetectorPermission,)

def get_group_from_detector_id(
    self, detector_id: str, organization: Organization
) -> Group | None:
    validated_detector_id = to_valid_int_id("detectorId", detector_id)
    try:
        detector = (
            Detector.objects.with_type_filters()
            .select_related("project")
            .get(id=validated_detector_id)

sentry-vuln-040

Workflow detector disconnect skips per-project permission checks on removed connections.

getsentry/sentry@9fc06de579fbView source

def can_edit_detector_workflow_connections(detector: Detector, request: Request) -> bool:
    """
    Anyone with alert write access to the project can connect/disconnect detectors of any type,
    which is slightly different from full edit access which differs by detector type.
    """
    return request.access.has_any_project_scope(
        detector.project, USER_CREATED_DETECTOR_REQUIRED_SCOPES
    )

sentry-vuln-041

DiscoverSavedQueryVisitEndpoint.post skips check_object_permissions.

getsentry/sentry@9fc06de579fbView source

@cell_silo_endpoint
class DiscoverSavedQueryVisitEndpoint(DiscoverSavedQueryBase):
    publish_status = {
        "POST": ApiPublishStatus.PRIVATE,
    }

    def has_feature(self, organization, request):
        return features.has("organizations:discover-query", organization, actor=request.user)

    def post(self, request: Request, organization, query) -> Response:
        """
        Update last_visited and increment visits counter
        """

sentry-vuln-042

InsightsStarredSegment stores user-supplied project_id without org or project access validation.

getsentry/sentry@9fc06de579fbView source

def get_rule(
    slack_request: SlackActionRequest, organization: Organization, group_type: int
) -> Rule | None:
    from sentry.notifications.notification_action.utils import should_fire_workflow_actions

    """Get the rule that fired"""
    rule_id = slack_request.callback_data.get("rule")
    if not rule_id:
        return None

sentry-vuln-043

InternalRegisteredTemplatesEndpoint is reachable by any authenticated user instead of superuser only.

getsentry/sentry@9fc06de579fbView source

@control_silo_endpoint
class InternalRegisteredTemplatesEndpoint(Endpoint):
    owner = ApiOwner.ECOSYSTEM
    permission_classes = (SentryIsAuthenticated,)
    publish_status = {"GET": ApiPublishStatus.PRIVATE}

    def get(self, request: Request) -> Response:
        response: dict[str, list[dict[str, Any]]] = defaultdict(list)
        for source, template_cls in template_registry.registrations.items():

sentry-vuln-044

AuthIndexEndpoint.put fail-opens superuser reauth when SaaS runs with SUPERUSER_ORG_ID=None.

getsentry/sentry@6993246259d0View source

validator = AuthVerifyValidator(data=request.data)

if not (request.user.is_superuser and request.data.get("isSuperuserModal")):
    try:
        validator.is_valid(raise_exception=True)
    except ValidationError:
        return Response({"detail": {"code": MISSING_PASSWORD_OR_U2F_CODE}}, status=400)

    authenticated = self._verify_user_via_inputs(validator, request)
else:
    verify_authenticator = False

    if not DISABLE_SSO_CHECK_FOR_LOCAL_DEV and not is_self_hosted():
        if SUPERUSER_ORG_ID:
            verify_authenticator = organization_service.check_organization_by_id(
                id=SUPERUSER_ORG_ID, only_visible=False

sentry-vuln-045

Public preprod install-details resolves artifact by org and returns metadata plus install URLs without project access.

getsentry/sentry@7f41cc502faaView source

# Check if this is an org-level method
if method_name in public_org_seer_method_registry:

sentry-vuln-046

Pull-request size-analysis download resolves artifact by org and streams raw size-analysis JSON without project access.

getsentry/sentry@7f41cc502faaView source

    artifact = PreprodArtifact.objects.get(
        id=int(artifact_id),
        project__organization_id=organization.id,
    )
except (PreprodArtifact.DoesNotExist, ValueError):
    raise PreprodArtifactResourceDoesNotExist

cutoff = get_size_retention_cutoff(organization)
if artifact.date_added < cutoff:
    return Response({"detail": "This build's size data has expired."}, status=404)

all_size_metrics = list(artifact.get_size_metrics())

sentry-vuln-047

WorkflowEngineRuleEndpoint authorizes URL project but resolves workflow-backed rules by org and rule or workflow ID.

getsentry/sentry@7f41cc502faaView source

@extend_schema(tags=["Alerts"])
@cell_silo_endpoint
class ProjectRuleDetailsEndpoint(WorkflowEngineRuleEndpoint):

sentry-vuln-048

Project size-analysis comparison download authorizes URL project but resolves comparisons by org and metric IDs only.

getsentry/sentry@7f41cc502faaView source

    comparison_obj = PreprodArtifactSizeComparison.objects.select_related(
        "head_size_analysis__preprod_artifact",
        "base_size_analysis__preprod_artifact",
    ).get(
        head_size_analysis_id=head_size_metric_id,
        base_size_analysis_id=base_size_metric_id,
        organization_id=project.organization_id,
    )
except PreprodArtifactSizeComparison.DoesNotExist:
    logger.info(
        "preprod.size_analysis.compare.api.download.no_comparison_obj",
        extra={
            "head_size_metric_id": head_size_metric_id,

sentry-vuln-049

GitHub install flow accepts unknown installation IDs before trusted webhook sender validation.

getsentry/sentry@7f41cc502faaView source

# has data (e.g. installation_id from a GitHub redirect) that needs
# to be available to pipeline steps.
serializer_cls = pipeline.provider.get_initial_data_serializer_cls()

sentry-vuln-050

CODEOWNERS code-mapping GET resolves config by org and returns raw CODEOWNERS without checking config.project.

getsentry/sentry@7f41cc502faaView source

def serialize(self, obj, attrs, user, **kwargs):
    from sentry.api.validators.project_codeowners import build_codeowners_associations

    data = {
        "id": str(obj.id),
        "raw": obj.raw,
        "dateCreated": obj.date_added,

sentry-vuln-051

Bitbucket Server accepts unsigned public webhooks with no HMAC, shared secret, or IP validation.

getsentry/sentry@7f41cc502faaView source

urlpatterns = [
    re_path(
        r"^organizations/(?P<organization_id>[^/]+)/webhook/(?P<integration_id>\d+)/$",

sentry-vuln-052

Data forwarding API returns decrypted provider credentials such as Segment, AWS, and Splunk secrets in config responses.

getsentry/sentry@7f41cc502faaView source

    ],
)
config = EncryptedJSONField(default=dict)

sentry-vuln-053

Sentry App external issue actions accept org:integrations without the event scope used by sibling endpoints.

getsentry/sentry@7f41cc502faaView source

@control_silo_endpoint
class SentryAppInstallationExternalIssueActionsEndpoint(SentryAppInstallationBaseEndpoint):

sentry-vuln-054

Relocation retry leaks relocation existence and state before owner or elevated authorization.

getsentry/sentry@7f41cc502faaView source

    "POST": ApiPublishStatus.EXPERIMENTAL,
}
permission_classes = (SentryIsAuthenticated,)

sentry-vuln-055

Public org-level Seer RPC methods can query project-backed data without applying the caller's project access.

getsentry/sentry@7f41cc502faaView source

# Check if this is an org-level method
if method_name in public_org_seer_method_registry:

sentry-vuln-056

API authorization listing can expose a fresh OAuth app clientSecret to non-owner grantees during the reveal window.

getsentry/sentry@7f41cc502faaView source

@register(ApiApplication)
class ApiApplicationSerializer(Serializer):
    def serialize(self, obj, attrs, user, **kwargs):

sentry-vuln-057

Uptime autodetect fetches robots.txt through raw urllib instead of Sentry's SSRF-safe HTTP stack.

getsentry/sentry@7f41cc502faaView source

)
return

sentry-vuln-058

Detector anomaly-data endpoint resolves detectors or alert rules by org and returns Seer data without project access.

getsentry/sentry@7f41cc502faaView source

@extend_schema(tags=["Workflows"])
@cell_silo_endpoint
class OrganizationDetectorAnomalyDataEndpoint(OrganizationEndpoint):

sentry-vuln-059

AlertRuleDetector lookup returns detector, alert-rule, and rule mappings without filtering by accessible projects.

getsentry/sentry@7f41cc502faaView source

}
owner = ApiOwner.ISSUES
permission_classes = (OrganizationDetectorPermission,)

sentry-vuln-060

Newline-capable PR filenames can inject or override $GITHUB_OUTPUT values forwarded to getsentry workflow dispatch.

getsentry/sentry@7f41cc502faaView source

  GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
run: |
  gh api repos/${{ github.repository }}/pulls/${{ github.event.number }}/files \

sentry-vuln-061

Branch name is shell-interpolated in scripts/analyze-styled.ts history analysis commands.

getsentry/sentry@7f41cc502faaView source

logger.debug('Script not found in commit, copying from current version...');
// Get the current script content and write it temporarily
child_process.execSync(

sentry-vuln-062

client_secret_jwt does not require exp, and the jti replay cache is shorter than token lifetime.

getsentry/sentry@7f41cc502faaView source

try:
    payload = jwt.decode(encoded_jwt, client_secret, algorithms=["HS256"])

sentry-vuln-063

Statsig signed timestamp is included in HMAC input but not checked for freshness.

getsentry/sentry@7f41cc502faaView source

    return audit_logs

def validate(self, message_bytes: bytes) -> bool:

sentry-vuln-064

Invalid Bitbucket webhook signatures log the computed HMAC.

getsentry/sentry@7f41cc502faaView source

def is_valid_signature(body: bytes, secret: str, signature: str) -> bool:

sentry-vuln-065

Invalid Discord signatures log the full decoded body, including possible interaction tokens or user text.

getsentry/sentry@7f41cc502faaView source

try:
    verify_signature(public_key, signature, timestamp, body)
except InvalidSignature:

sentry-vuln-066

Discord signature timestamp is verified cryptographically but not freshness-checked.

getsentry/sentry@7f41cc502faaView source

    self._validate_identity()

def authorize(self) -> None:

sentry-vuln-067

Legacy unsigned GitHub Enterprise webhook bypass trusts attacker-supplied host headers if a legacy host is configured.

getsentry/sentry@7f41cc502faaView source

# at the moment.

allowed_legacy_hosts = options.get(

sentry-vuln-068

GitHub Enterprise missing-integration and invalid-signature responses differ, enabling installation ID enumeration.

getsentry/sentry@7f41cc502faaView source

    return HttpResponse(status=400)

secret = self.get_secret(event, host)

sentry-vuln-069

Atlassian install JWT verification accepts the algorithm from the unverified token header.

getsentry/sentry@7f41cc502faaView source

if token is None:
    raise AtlassianConnectValidationError("No token parameter")
headers = jwt.peek_header(token)

sentry-vuln-070

Valid Jira Server webhook JWT is logged and has no expiry.

getsentry/sentry@7f41cc502faaView source

    handle_status_change(integration, data)
except (ApiError, ObjectDoesNotExist) as err:
    extra.update({"token": token, "error": str(err)})

sentry-vuln-071

Shared Atlassian helper selects JWT algorithm from the unverified header.

getsentry/sentry@7f41cc502faaView source

if token is None:
    raise AtlassianConnectValidationError("No token parameter")
headers = jwt.peek_header(token)

sentry-vuln-072

Legacy OAuth apps allow prefix redirect URI matching.

getsentry/sentry@7f41cc502faaView source

            return True

# Then: prefix-only match (legacy behavior). Log on success.

sentry-vuln-073

Release webhook token uses uuid1().hex.

getsentry/sentry@7f41cc502faaView source

def _regenerate_token(self, project):
    token = uuid1().hex

sentry-vuln-074

Seer RPC HMAC does not bind the URL path.

getsentry/sentry@7f41cc502faaView source

_, signature_data = signature.split(":", 2)

signature_input = body

sentry-vuln-075

Mailgun timestamp and nonce are signed but never freshness- or reuse-checked.

getsentry/sentry@7f41cc502faaView source

@control_silo_view
class MailgunInboundWebhookView(View):
    def verify(self, api_key, token, timestamp, signature):

sentry-vuln-076

Release webhook capability signature is long-lived and embedded in the URL path.

getsentry/sentry@7f41cc502faaView source

@cell_silo_view
class ReleaseWebhookView(View):
    def verify(self, plugin_id, project_id, token, signature):

sentry-vuln-077

Heroku release attribution uses unverified email lookup.

getsentry/sentry@7f41cc502faaView source

email = data.get("user", {}).get("email") or data.get("actor", {}).get("email")

users = user_service.get_many_by_email(

sentry-vuln-078

Legacy Jira plugin disables TLS verification while sending Basic Auth.

getsentry/sentry@7f41cc502faaView source

self.username = username
self.password = password
super().__init__(verify_ssl=False)

sentry-vuln-079

Jira JQL autocomplete escapes quotes but not backslashes.

getsentry/sentry@7f41cc502faaView source

    return self.post(self.COMMENT_URL.format(issue_key), data={"body": comment})

def search_issues(self, project, query):

sentry-vuln-080

Autofix URLs are passed to window.open without protocol or host allowlist.

getsentry/sentry@7f41cc502faaView source

sourceCards.push({
  key: `code-${url}`,
  onClick: () => window.open(url, '_blank'),

sentry-vuln-081

Copy-as-curl escapes values but not HTTP method or header names.

getsentry/sentry@7f41cc502faaView source

if (defined(data.method) && data.method !== 'GET') {
  result += ' \\\n -X ' + data.method;

sentry-vuln-082

ECharts tooltip interpolates feature flag name and action as HTML.

getsentry/sentry@7f41cc502faaView source

  'Feature Flag'
)}</strong></span></div>`,
`<span class="tooltip-label-align-start"><code class="tooltip-code-no-margin">${data.name}</code>${data.label.formatter()}</span>`,

sentry-vuln-083

CSV macro sanitizer misses tab and carriage-return prefixes.

getsentry/sentry@7f41cc502faaView source

}

function disableMacros(value: string | null | boolean | number) {

sentry-vuln-084

ECharts tooltip renders mobile build seriesName from artifact metadata as HTML.

getsentry/sentry@7f41cc502faaView source

const value = (param.value as number[])[1]!;
const marker = typeof param.marker === 'string' ? param.marker : '';
return `<div><span class="tooltip-label">${marker}<strong>${param.seriesName}</strong></span> ${formatBytesBase10(value)}</div>`;

sentry-vuln-085

ECharts treemap tooltip renders uploaded artifact path and name as HTML.

getsentry/sentry@7f41cc502faaView source

const percent = ((value / totalSize) * 100).toFixed(2);
const pathHtml = params.data?.path
  ? `<div style="font-size: 12px; color: ${theme.tokens.content.secondary}; line-height: 1.2;">${params.data.path}</div>`

sentry-vuln-086

Self-hosted integration domainName can construct https://user@attacker style URLs.

getsentry/sentry@7f41cc502faaView source

}

const [domainName, orgName] = integration.domainName.split('/');

Open Questions

Backfill exact vulnerable SHAs from original tickets, fix commits, or raw run logs.
Add excluded candidate or latent findings only after they are confirmed as exploitable vulnerabilities in getsentry/sentry.